Gender, segmented labor markets, continental welfare states and equal employment policies: The case of Spain by Valiente Fernández, Celia
10 Gender, segmented labour markets, 
continental welfare states and equal 
employment policies, the case of Spain1 
Celia Valiente 
A frrst glance at the position of women in the Spanish labour market would lead us 
to conclude that a significant advancement has taken place at least in the last three 
or four decades. The Spanish female activity rate2 has constantly increased, and it 
is now 35% (Eurostat, 1996b; 1995 data). The former pattem of most women leav-
ing the labour market (if ever present there) when they got married or had the first 
child seems to have been reversed, since currently many young women remain in 
the labour force after marriage or the first delivery (CES, 1994b, p.ll), as can be 
seen in Table 10.1. In comparative terms, part-time work is stillless widespread in 
Spain, where it accounts for 17% of female employment, 3% of male employment, 
and 7% of total employment - the equivalent European Union (EU) average per-
centages are 31%, 3%, and 16% respectively (Eurostat, 1996b; 1995 data). This 
means that even if the percentage of women who belong to the active population is 
lower in Spain than in most EU member states, most Spanish women who work 
for wages have fuIl-time jobs which provide them with a higher degree of econo-
míe independence than jobs in other EU member states, where part-tirne employ-
ment is much more prevalent. In all countries, women are overrepresented among 
workers who eam the lowest salaries. In Spain, low-eamers are protected by a 
statutory national minimum wage, which is the same for all sectors and alI jobs, 
and which might be improved by coIlective agreements (there is a reduced míni-
mum wage for workers under 18 years) (OECD, 1994, p.148). 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned advancement of women in the Spanish 
labour market is more modest than what a superficial observation would lead us to 
think. As explained in the first section of this paper, the first reason is that the 
labour market is not homogeneous but a segmented space made up of different 
sectors. Each sector is composed of a different type of worker and functions accor-
ding to its own logic. Women are underrepresented in the sector in which workers 
enjoy better working conditions, and are overrepresented in the remaining sectors, 
2 
I would like to thank Javier Astudillo, Juan C. Rodríguez and Salvador Seguí for 
their valuable comments on an earlier draft. It was presented at the meeting of the 
European Science Foundation Network on Gender Inequality and the European Re-
gions, Mekrijiirvi (Finland), September 19-22, 1996. 
The female activity rate is the proportion of active women (emp1oyed and registered 
unemployed) in the female population of working age (women aged 15 or over, for 
Eurostat statistics). 
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where working conditions are worse. As described in tbe second section, another 
reason is that in Spain the welfare state is heavily transfer-oriented (the main 
benefits are monetary transfers for sorne people who fail to earn an income in the 
market), and provides very few social services. Thus, people who have caring 
responsibilities (usually women) get hardly any assistance from the state to help 
them combine tbeir professional and family responsibilities. The tbird section of 
this paper argues that the equal employment policies elaborated in Spain in the last 
two decades have had liule impact in changing the subordinated position of 
women in the labour market because tbese policies have not challenged eitber tbe 
segmentation of the labour market or the aforementioned characteristics of the 
welfare state. The fourth section argues that for several reasons the labour market 
and the welfare state have provided a different set of opportunities and constraints 
for women of different cohorts. Secondary sources constitute the main data for this 
papero 
Age 
16-19 
20·24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-
Total 
Table 10.1 
Female Activity, employment and unemployment rates by 
sex and age, Spain, 1994 
Activity 
20.9 
55.6 
73.6 
64.6 
61.7 
55.1 
45.5 
35.2 
26.0 
15.2 
3.0 
0.5 
36.9 
Employment 
8.7 
30.3 
47.8 
45.1 
46.1 
42.5 
37.2 
29.1 
22.1 
13.9 
3.0 
0.5 
26.0 
Unemployrnent 
58.1 
45.5 
35.0 
30.2 
25.3 
22.8 
18.3 
17.4 
14.9 
8.7 
3.3 
O 
29.5 
Source: Calculated by the author from INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística] 1996. 
Encuesta de Población Activa: Resultados detallados, segundo trimestre 1996. 
~adrid:INE.pp.44. 152,334. 
Female activity rate: proportion of active women in each age group. 
Female employment rate: proportioll of employed women in each age group. 
Female unemployrnent rate: proportion of unemployed women among fue active women 
of each age group. 
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L Segmented labour markets 
As in the majority of countries, most individuals in Spain achieve economic inde-
pendence by working and earning wages, due to the absence of a universal system 
ofincome support (O'Connor, 1993). 
Labour market segmentation (LMS) theories developed in opposition to the 
neo-classical model of the labour market (a unitary market govemed by salary 
fluctuations, in which salaries are flxed at the intersection of the demand and supp-
ly of labour). LMS analysts empirically observed the existence of different labour 
compartments (or segments), which are characterised by different rules of entry, 
working conditions, salary levels, degree of stability in employment, and promo-
tion and training opportunities. Within each segment workers compete for jobs, 
salaries and working conditions. There are barriers against the mobility of workers 
across compartments. LMS theories explain the existence of different compart-
ments in the labour market beyond the existence of imperfections in the func-
tioning of the market (caused, for instance, by the intervention of the state), which 
is the explanation provided by neo-classical analysts. LMS theorists argue that the 
existence of different labour markets is the result of a number of different factors, 
among them, the strategies of employers (or firms); the role played by the state as 
employer; state regulation of the labour market; workers' coIlective actions; or the 
functioning of other institutions (e.g. the family, in which different people develop 
different attitudes and roles, which will be later reflected in their market beha-
viour) (Dex, 1991 [1985], pp.151-163; Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Piore, 1971; 
Wilkinson, 1981). 
From a gender point of view, the labour market is divided up differently in 
different countries. First, analysts have identifled a fundamental division between 
part-time and fuIl-time workers in sorne countries, for instance, Great Britain. In 
comparison with fuIl-time jobs, the majority of part-time jobs are characterised by 
lower pay, lower training and lower career prospects, and have fewer welfare state 
benefits attached. Part-time jobs also tend to exist in a smaller range of occupa-
tions, and are overwhelmingly performed by women (Lewis, 1992; O'Connor, 
1993; Ruggie, 1984). 
There is another type of differentiation in the labour market (from the gender 
point of view) in some countries, for instance in Scandinavia. Proportionately 
more jobs in the public sector are today performed by women, while many more 
jobs in the private sector are performed by meno Many state jobs are in the area of 
public social services. In these times of welfare state retrenchment it is reasonable 
to suspect that losses in 'female' jobs are going to occur (Langan and Ostner, 
1991, p.135). 
In Spain, the crucial divisions in the labour market are neither between Part-
time and full-time jobs, nor between the public or the private sectors. Pérez-Díaz 
and Rodríguez (1994) convincingly argued that the Spanish labour market consists 
of four different spaces: space 1 (permanent workers); space 2 (temporary wor-
kers); space 3 (workers in the informal economy); and space 4 (people who do not 
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perform paid work). These four spaces are populated differently by men and wo-
men. lt is to the description of these four spaces that we now turno 
Space 1, which is also called the 'core', consisted in the mid-1990s of almost 
6 million workers with indefmite-duration jobs, that is, somewhat less than two 
thirds of the workers of the formal economy (but a mínimal proportíon of new 
hiring). Sorne (slight) gender differences existed with regard to permanent employ-
mento Permanent employment accounted for 67% of male employment and 
62% of female employment (Eurostat, 1996b; 1995 data). Core workers are 
protected by high severance payments, and generally speaking receive higher sala-
ries than other workers. Permanent contracts were strongly promoted under the 
former right-wing authoritarian political regime (1936-1975), when most family 
needs were thought to be satisfied by the salary attached to the indefmite-duration 
job of the male breadwinner rather than by social policy, and when free mobility of 
labour was conceptualised as an ínherent source of social disturbance, which 
policy-makers attempted to make disappear. In fact. until the mid-1980s, and with 
the exception of sorne seasonal activities such as tourism or agriculture, permanent 
employment was mandatory (Dolado and Jimeno, 1996, p.6; Pérez-Díaz and 
Rodríguez, 1994).3 
Space 2 is composed of about 3 million workers with fixed-duration con-
tracts, that is, more than one third of the workers in the formal economy. In Spain, 
the percentage of temporary wage-earners out of the total of wage-earners (35%) is 
not only by far the highest in the EV, but it is more than double the second highest 
(16% for Finland) and the EV average (14%). There are also sorne slight gender 
differences in this regard, since temporary employment accounts for 33% of male 
employment and for 38% of female employment (Eurostat, 1996b; 1995 data). 
It is politically very difficult to reduce the high severance payments and the 
higher salaries associated with indefinite duration contracts, because permanent 
workers are the majority of workers, the majority of trade union members, and a 
significant number of voters in political and union elections. Therefore, the díffe-
rent governments in post-authoritarian Spain have only attempted very timíd re-
forms of the regulation of indefinite duration jobs, but in 1984 permitted fixed-
term contracts for all types of activities, whether temporary or not (with much 
lower employer contributions to the social security system than for indefinite-
duration contracts).4 The number of fixed-term contracts have sharply raised since 
1984, and the vast majority of the people employed since then, many of whom are 
the young, have signed temporary contracts. In the second quarter of 1996, fixed-
3 
4 
Permanent contracts were also widespread after World War 11 in the decades of 
economic growth and (male) full employment in many Western countries governed 
by democratic regimes. 
The relaxation of the rules protecting jobs for the new workers, 'while leaving intact 
the job protection of existing job holders' was a labour policy that was established in 
many European countries in the 1980s, although the relaxation took different forms 
(e.g. the absence of labour law in relation to many of the new contracts such as in the 
UK, or allowing temporary contracts such as in Spain) (Cousins, 1994, pp.55-56). 
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term employment accounted for 86% of the total employment of people aged 16-
19 years, for 73% of people aged 20-24, and for 51 % of people aged 25-29.5 
In general, temporary workers earn lower salaries than permanent workers 
due, among other things, to the lack of seniority and discrimination, and receive 
less training. Fixed-term contracts are more common in sorne sectors of the econo-
my (agriculture and construction) than in others (manufacturing). Nevertheless, it 
should be stressed that very often permanent and temporary workers work for the 
same firms or state departments and even perform the same tasks (Bentolila and 
Dolado, 1993; 1994; Bentolila, Segura and Toharla, 1991; Dolado and Bentolila, 
1992; Jimeno, 1993). 
There is a high turn-over of workers with temporary contracts for three 
reasons. First, temporary contracts have low or no fIring costs. Second, a person 
can be hired on a temporary basis up to a certain number of years. Afterwards, the 
frrm either has to hire the person on a permanent basis or dismiss him/her (and hire 
another temporary worker after a mandatory waiting period). This lalter oplion is 
the most usual, since the conversion rate of temporary into permanent contracts is 
very low (about 10-15%). Third, the fact that temporary workers are, in sorne 
cases, protected by unemployment benefits after their dismissal makes it easier for 
employers to dismiss them, and for temporary workers to accept the dismissal. 
Therefore, being temporarily employed in the formal economy and unemployed 
for sorne intermittent periods has become a 'permanent' condítion for many young 
workers, who might also participate in the underground economy (Bentolila and 
Dolado, 1993, pp.117-119; Dolado and Bentolila, 1992, p.15).6 
Space 3 is the informal economy. In the mid-1980s between 1.5 and 2.5 mil-
Iion people worked in this sector (Pérez-Díaz and Rodríguez, 1994, p.31). It is 
worth mentioning that informal workers are not only those officially unemployed 
but also sorne of those permanently or temporarily employed in the formal econo-
my, who moonlight (Bentolila and Blanchard, 1990, p.239). Women are a signi-
ficant proportion of informal workers. It has been calculated that, in the mid-
1980s, roughly the same number of men and women were employed in the infor-
mal economy, while about 75% of the formal jobs were performed by men. Infor-
mal jobs are more prevalent among very young women, among married women, 
and among the least educated women(Ruesga, 1991). 
Space 4 comprises, among others, the registered unemployed, whose number 
has oscillated between 2 and 3.5 million people since the 1980s (Pérez-Díaz and 
5 
6 
The proponion of temporary employment is considerably smaller for the remaining 
age groupS. Fixed-term employment accounts for 28% of total employment of people 
aged 30-39, for 19% ofpeople aged 40-49, for 15% ofpeople aged 50-59. and for 11 
of people aged 60 or over - calculated by the author from data contained in lNE 
(1996:237-238). 
As this is being written (March 1997), employers and trade unionists are negotiating 
a reform of the labour market in order to modify the regulation of permanent and 
temporary contracts. The negotiations have not been concluded, so 1 will leave the 
discussion of this for another papero 
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Rodríguez, 1994, p.32). The Spanish unemployment rate7 (23%) is the highest in 
the EU, and is more than double the EU average (11%) (Eurostat, 1996b; 1995 
data). Two experts on the labour market have this to say about the Spanish un-
employment rate: 
An initial reaction to these figures is to take them with disbelief on the 
grounds of the existence of a large black economy which acts as a 'shock 
absorber'. Nonetheless, the official unemployment rate is approximately 
correet: taking account of the underground economy and correcting for 
sorne technical problems in the elaboration of the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey will reduce this rate by 3 points at most. 
(Dolado and Jimeno, 1996, p.2) 
Gender differences are considerable here, since the female unemployment rate 
(registered unemployed women as a percentage of the female active population) is 
30%, while the male unemployment rate (registered unemployed men as a percen-
tage of the male active population) is 18%. The Spanish female unemployment 
rate (30%) is not only the highest in the EU, but it is almost twice as high as the 
seeond highest (16% for ItaIy and Finland), and is more than double the EU aver-
age (12%). Moreover, Spanish women are overrepresented among those suffering 
what has been termed 'the worst types of unemployment': those unemployed for 
long periods, and those who are frrst-time job seekers (Cousins, 1994, p.55). 60% 
of unemployed women (and 49% of unemployed men) have been unemployed for 
twelve months or more. 27%of unemployed women (and 17% of unemployed 
men) are first-time job seekers (Eurostat, 1996b; 1995 data). In fact, many women 
enter the labour market not by starting a job but by registering as unemployed in 
the employment office. 
In Spain, sorne of the registered unemployed receive unemployment benefits 
because they have previously worked and made the required contributions to the 
social security system. In 1995 approximately over 60% of non-agricultural un-
employed workers received unemployment benefits (Dolado and Jimeno, 1996, 
p.5). Women are economically less proteeted than men by the state in case of un-
employment. For instance, in 1995 unemployed women received contributory 
unemployrnent benefits over a shorter period than unemployed men (15.3 and 17.2 
months respectively - MTAS, 1996, p.794). Unemployed women reeeive, on aver-
age, lower contributory benefits than men (2,569 and 3,155 pesetas respectively, 
gross average amount per day - MTAS, 1996, p.795; 1995 data). 
Generally speaking, in colleetive bargaining, the main unions have defended 
the interests of core workers, that is, the preservation of their stability in employ-
ment and higher wages. A1though the trade union membership as a percentage of 
wage earners is in Spain among the lowest in the EU (11 % in 1990) (OECD, 1994, 
p.184), the laws which regulate work council elections and collective bargaining 
7 The unemployment rate is the proportion of registered unemployment in the active 
population (the employed and the registered unemployed). 
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place a lot of importance on main unions, and the coverage of collective bar-
gaining is high, about 70% in the mid-1990s (Dolado and Jimeno, 1996, p.6). 
Collective bargaining is often studied in Westem Europe as a process that is domi-
nated by 'insiders', who are last perlod employees, protected by high dismissal 
costs and with the specific skills necessary for the functioning of fmos. Insiders 
defend their interests and disregard the interests of 'outsiders' (the unemployed 
who want to be hired). In Spain not alllast perlod employees are insiders but only 
those with indefinite-duration jobs. Due to the average short duration of fixed ter-
med contracts8 and to the faet that temporary workers are less unionised than core 
workers, it is very unlikely that temporary workers participate in the committees 
which take part in collective bargaining. If the firm or the sector is in trouble, 
temporary workers could always be paid less, forced to work longer hours, and/or 
easily dismissed (Bentolila and Dolado, 1993, 1994; Dolado and Bentolila, 1992; 
Dolado and Jimeno, 1996, pp.6-7).9 
11. Continental welfare state in Spain 
According to Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states in industrial capitalist 
countries,lO that of Spain (and Italy, France and West Germany, arnong others) is 
of a continental type. In continental welfare states, social rlghts are linked to occu-
pational categories and status (for instance, there are different insurance schemes 
for different types of workers). They (and their dependants) are the beneficiarles of 
the main social prograrnmes. The redistributive effects of social policy are mini-
mal. One result of this social policy is a certain degree of decornmodification, that 
is, 'the degree to which individual s, or families, can uphold a socially aeceptable 
standard of living independently of market participation' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p.37. Provision of welfare benefits is mainly publico The welfare state aims at re-
inforcing the traditionally crucial role of the family as welfare provider. Thus, the 
8 
9 
The average length of new temporary contraet is very short: 3 months and 9 days 
(Missé, 1997, p.64). 
There are signs of a limited ehange in the aetions of trade unionists in eollective bar-
gaining. For instanee, newspapers repon that, due to the high rates of unemployment 
and temporary employment, trade unionists at the level of the firm are beeoming 
more willing to aeeept salary moderation or other employer demands in exehange for 
the employers' eommitment to job ereation and the transformation of temporary into 
permanent eontraets (see, for instanee, El Pa(s 24 February 1977, p.65, for an examp-
le of this kind of agreement in the automobile industry). 
On the other hand, it has been argued that, in general, Spanish trade unionists have 
defended the interests of the unemployed and the temporarily employed when they 
participate not in eollective bargaining, but in policy-making, for instance, pressu-
rising the government to increase the level and coverage of unemployment benefits. 
10 Esping-Andersen (1990, pp.3-4) analysed the variation across welfare states along 
three dimensions: the type of social rights; the type of stratifieation that the welfare 
state produces; and the interrelation of the state, the market and the family in the 
provision of welfare. 
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state tends to intervene only when the capacity of the family to act as social pro-
vider is exhausted (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp.27-28, 48).11 
In Spain, as in any other continental welfare state, participation in the labour 
market is the maín route of access to welfare state benefits, since, generally speak-
ing, most of these have been historically given to workers (and their dependants) 
who have made the required contributions to the system (Guillén, 1992, p.12; 
1996). The two main exceptions to thís general rule are health care and compulsory 
education (for people who are 6-16 years old), which are programmes of universal 
coverage. 
Historically, adult women have had access to all types of welfare state, not 
onIy vía labour market partícipation but also via marriage, or more broadly speak-
ing via family ties (Lewis, 1992, p.161; Orloff, 1993, p.308). Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that in former times marriage provided access to very few 
benefits in Spaín (maínly to health care and survívors' benefits). Similarly, nowa-
days widow(er)'s pensions are the only important benefit to which women (and 
men) are entitled via marriage. Moreover, in all types of welfare states benefits 
acquired via marriage are less generous than benefits acquired vía labour market 
partícípation (Orloff, 1993, p.315).12 
In all societies, women are those who overwhelmingly províde care for 
people who, for any reason, need the care of others, such as the fraíl elderly, the 
disabled, the ill or small children (Orloff, 1993, p.313). This provísion of care is, in 
some cases, conflictual or even incompatible wíth the requírements of the perfor-
mance of paid work. Of course, it cannot be argued that women have a subordinate 
position in the Spanish labour market just because a significant number of them 
perform (unpaíd) care work for others. In fact, some women do not provide care 
for other people at all, whíle otbers do so for limited periods of their lives. The 
reasons whích account for the different positions of men and women in the labour 
market are multiple. Nevertheless, other things being equal, a welfare state which 
11 Two other types of welfare states exist in the classification made by Esping-Andersen 
(1990:, pp.7-28): the social democratic and the liberal welfare states. In the social 
democratic welfare state, which exists in Scandinavia, universal benefits are nume-
rouS. De-commodification is high. Social progruns are directed 10 all social classes. 
The purpose of social policy is 10 attain equality. The state provides generous care 
services for children, the elderly and other people in nced of care. 
In the liberal welfare state, which exists in the United States, Canada and Australia 
among others, 'means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-
insurance plans predominate. Benefits cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, 
usually working-class, state dependants'. De-commodification is very low. The state 
encourages market provision of welfare. 
12 For example, in Spain on November 1, 1996, the average widow(er)'s pension 
(acquired via marriage) was 47,900 pesetas (2,521 Swcdish crowns), while the ave-
rage contributory old age pension (acquired via labour market participation) was 
78,400 pesetas (4,126 Swedish crowns) (MTAS, 1997:490). AH numcrical data in 
this paper are given in monetary tenns, in Spanish pesetas and in Swedish crowns 
(converted at the March 1997 rate of 1 Swcdish crown=19 pesetas). 
For a description of the requirements to receive the aforementioned pensions, see 
also notes 19 and 20. 
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provides numerous social services facilitates female labour force participation 
more than a welfare state which does not provide these services, because the for-
mer saves women from providing care for others (on an unpaid basis). 
The Spanish welfare state, as any other of continental type, only facilitates 
the participation of women in the labour force to a limited extent, because the wel-
fare state is heavily transfer-oriented and offers very few social services.l3 In the 
early 1990s, approximately one tenth of the welfare in continental welfare states 
was dedicated to social services (health care excluded), while the figure was one 
third in the social democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1995, p.2).14 Let 
me illustrate this point with the example of the policies for two groups of the 
population in need of care: children under six, when mandatory school starts; and 
the elderIy. This makes my analysis different from most feminist researchers 
(O'Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993; Ruggie, 1984) who only focus attention on the 
policies related to the care of children. This narrower focus is inappropriate for stu-
dying Southem Europe (and probably every other country as well), where families 
(that is, mainly women) are generally in charge of the care not onIy of small child-
ren, but also of any adult who, for whatever reason (e.g. illness or disability), 
needs the care of other people. 
1I.a Public policies for children under su 
My next point is that parents receive modest aid from the state for children under 
six: 15 paid matemity leave and non-paid parentalleave as a substitute rather than 
as a complement to child care; hardly any child care services for children aged two 
or under; means-tested child allowances; and low tax exceptions for dependent 
children and for child careo The main exception to this general rule is the relatively 
generous supply of pre-school services for four- and five-year-old children, ser-
vices which are conceptualised by policy-makers not as gender equality pro-
grammes (with the aim of promoting the participation of mothers in the labour 
market) but as educational programmes for the benefit of minors (especialIy of 
those who come from less privileged families) (Valiente, 1995). 
As for paid-matemity leave, working mothers who have been previously 
employed and have contributed to the social security system for at least 180 days 
within the five years previous to child birth are entitled to 16 uninterrupted weeks 
of paid leave. The number of years contributed and the level of contribution 
(which is proportional to the salary) are used to calculate the so-called regulatory 
13 For an analysis of the Spanish welfare state with the analytical focus on gender. see 
14 
Cousins (1995) and Guillén (fortheoming). 
If health eare is exeluded, social serviees inelude, among other things, 'day eare and 
youth serviees, eare of the aged and disabled, home help serviees, and the like, but 
also employment-related serviees sueh as rehabilitation sehemes and employment 
exehanges' (Esping-Andersen, 1995, p.2). 
15 This has also been the eonelusion of eomparative research on support for ehildren. 
See, for instanee, Bradshaw et al. (1993). 
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base (base reguladora). The amount received during parentalleave is 100% of the 
regulatory base. The right to retoro to one's job is guaranteed. Since 1989, if both 
parents perforro paid work, the father rnay take up to four of the fmal weeks leave 
(in this case the rnother rnust returo to work).16 There is also provision for up to 
three years of non-paid parentalleave for working rnothers or fathers. The right to 
return to one's job is only guaranteed during the first year. The right to a job in the 
same professional category is guaranteed during the second and third years. The 
period of leave is counted as effectively worked in terros of seniority (Guillén, 
forthcorning). The fact that, after this leave working wornen receive hardly any 
help frorn the state to combine family and work responsibilities has led sorne ob-
servers to conclude that in continental welfare states rnateroity and parentalleaves 
are a substitute and not a cornplement to child care (O'Connor, 1993). 
The rnain policies for children under six are educational preschool program-
mes for children aged four or overo In the academic year 1992-1993 the percentage 
of children who attended public preschool prograrnrnes was: 67.7 for five-year-old 
children; and 66.1 for four-year-old children. The extent of such programrnes is 
quite high in comparative terroso In contrast, the percentage of children aged three 
or under cared for in public centres was very low: 0.3 for those under one year old; 
1.3 for one-year-old children; and 3.0 for two-year-old children; and 24.3 for 
three-year-old children, as can be seen in Table 10.2. The table also shows that 
children younger than three are not taken care of in private centres either. 
Foreign observers are often impressed by the extent of pre-school program-
mes for four- and five-year-old children, and ernphasise that, in this regard, Spain 
is ahead of other countries, like the United Kingdorn (see, for instance, Cousins, 
1994, p.51). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that pre-school prograrnrnes are 
educational prograrnmes that have been established with the purpose of attaining 
equality arnong children frorn different social classes. These are not at all gender 
equality programrnes established to provide child care for working rnothers (or 
parents). Pre-school prograrnrnes cannot then be used by parents as perfect substi-
tutes for child care, since pre-school hours are shorter than working hours (and 
sornetirnes rnuch shorter and interrupted by a break). It should be rernernbered that 
in Spain rnost wornen who work for wages do so on a full-tirne basis. . 
It is irnportant to note that private child care or preschool centres are de ¡acto 
hardly regulated by the state. Moreover, paid care provided in prlvate premises (in 
the child's or the childrninder's horne) is not regulated by the state at aH. The 
Spanish non-regulation of prlvate centres and private care in hornes contrasts with 
the efforts rnade by most Westero govemments to control such sectors, a1though it 
is known that the implementation of these regulations is always uneven and in part 
unsuccessful, especially as regards care provided in hornes (Valiente, 1995). 
16 The number of fathers who take the last weeks of matemity leave is insignificant. 
The Spanish Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa) provides data de-
segregated by sex of wage-earners who are not working during the week when the 
survey questionnaire is administered. In the second quarter of 1996, 99% of wage-
earners who were not working due to matemity ¡eave were women, and the remain-
ing 1 % were men (INE, 1996: 205). 
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Table 10.2 
Percentage of children under 6 who attend centres, by age of child, and type 
of centre, Spain, academic year 1992·1993 
Age Total PubJic centres Private centres 
less than 1 0.6 0.3 0.3 
1 year 2.8 1.3 1.5 
2 years 8.7 3.0 5.7 
3 years 46.0 24.3 21.7 
4 years 97.1 66.1 31.0 
5 years 100 67.7 33.1 
Source: Calculated by the author from data contained in INE (1994, p.27; 1995, p.5) and 
MEC (1995, p.91). 
In Spain child allowances (except for handicapped children) are means-tested, the 
income threshold established in the means test is low (slightly aboye the national 
minimum wage) and their level is relatively modest in comparative terms (Guillén, 
forthcoming).17 This means that child allowances are not at all an important mo-
netary transfer, which might be used to pay for child careo The same could be said 
with regard to tax exemptions for dependent children and for child care expenses, 
whose amount is also relatively low,18 
To summarise, after the 16 weeks of paid matemity leave (for those who 
work for wages and have made the required contributions to the social security 
system), working women receive very little help from the state to combine work 
and family responsibilities: unpaid parentalleave; pre-school services for children 
17 Child allowances (prestaciones familiares por hijo a cargo) amounted to 36,000 
pesetas (1,895 Swedish crowns) per year in 1995 per dependent child younger than 
18 years. These allowances were given to family units whose yearly income was 
10wer than 1,080,540 pesetas (56,870 Swedish crowns). This income threshold in-
creased 15 per cent for each dependent child since the second. 
18 
Child allowances for handicapped children are not means-tested and their yearly 
level is higher. 
Those who pay the personal income tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas 
Ffsicas, IRPF) can benefit from tax exemptions for each dependent child. A child is 
defined as a person up to the age of 30 who lives with his/her parents and whose 
income does not reach a certain leve!. In 1997, this tax relief amounts to 21,100 
(1,110 Swedish crowns) for each of the first two children, 26,700 (1,405 Swedish 
crowns) for the third child, and 31,000 (1,674 Swedish crowns) for the fourth child 
and the following. 
In 1997, IRPF tax payers may be the beneficiarles of tax exemptions for 15 per 
cent of the amount of child care expenses (of the under-threes) up to a maximum of 
25,000 pesetas (1,316 Swedish crowns). The yearly income of the tax payer should 
be lower than 2,000,000 pesetas (105,263 Swedish crowns) or 3,000,000 pesetas 
(157,895 Swedish crowns) if both parents pay IRPF taxes jointly. Both parents have 
to work for wages. In the fiscal year 1993, 106,299 IRPF tax payers were the bene-
ficiarles of this tax exemption. The average tax exemption was 11,835 pesetas (623 
Swedish crowns) (MER, 1995:108). 
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aged three or over (pre-school hours are usually shorter than working hours); 
means-tested child allowances; and modest tax reHef (for dependent children and 
child care expenses). 
l/.b Public policies lor the aged 
Because the Spanish welfare state is so heavily transfer-oriented, it is important to 
study the income that the aged receive from state transfers. Since the retirement 
age in Spain is 65, in this paper the elderly are defined as those who are 65 years 
old or older. In Spain, most of the aged derive their main income from state 
pensions. Most analysts agree that, generally speaking, the economic situation of 
the elderly is very varied, but has improved significantIy for many of them in the 
Iast two decades. If oId peopIe have been previousIy empIoyed and have made the 
required contributions, they are entitIed to contributory retirement pensions.19 
Contributory retirement benefits are very generous, if benefit Ievels are not mea-
sured in absoIute terms but as a percentage of net earnings. NevertheIess, what is 
usualIy Iess emphasised is that, in many cases (but with important exceptions), if 
the eIderly person is in need of care, these contributory retirement pensions are not 
high enough to purchase all the carlng services needed at the market-rate, and that 
their beneficiarles are partIy (or totally) dependent on the care of (usual1y female) 
relatives (Esping-Andersen, 1995). The same is, of course, true for the other main 
source of income of the aged in Spain, contributory widow(er)'s pensions,20 and 
also for the two types of means-tested retirement benefits which exist for sorne of 
the people outside the contributory system: non-contributory and assistential bene-
fits. Moreover, in sorne of these means-tested prograrnmes the means test (imposed 
not on the applicant but on the family unit) is much Iess strict when the oId person 
lives with their children or parents than when s/he lives alone.21 In other words, 
19 In order te receive a contributory retirement pension, a person has to have contributed 
at least 15 years (at least two of these have to have been included within the eight 
years previous to the retirement). See note 12 for the average contributory retirement 
20 
21 
pensiono 
In order to receive a widow(er)'s pension, a person has to have been married to an 
employed person who had contributed for at least 500 days within the five years 
previous to death. The amount of the pension is 45 per cent of the regulatory base, 
that is, almost half of the contributory retirement pensiono See note 12 for the average 
widow(er)'s pensiono 
In order to receive a non-contributory old age pension the yearly income of the 
claimant must be below a certain level. This is the total amount of the pension for 
claimants living alone. If the claimant lives with other people (whether relatives or 
not), the incomes of all of them are counted. AH these incomes must again be below a 
certain level: the sum of the amount of the pension plus 70% of the pension mul-
tiplied by the number of people who live with the claimant minus one. Nevertheless, 
there is an exception to the general rule: when the old person lives with their children 
or parents. In this case aH aforementioned limits are raised 2.5 times. In 1996, the 
monthly amount of a non-contributory old age pension was 35,580 pesetas (1,873 
Swedish crowns. 
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the state sometimes provides clear incentives for old people to live with their 
relatives. 
The system of contributory retirement and means-tested old age benefits is 
not universal in Spain. People who have made the required contributions receive 
contributory benefits, and people who have not made the required contribution but 
live in family units whose level of income is low according to the means test re-
ceive means-tested benefits. Thus, people without the required contributions but 
whose farnily unit has a level of income higher than the income threshold estab-
lished in the means test do not receive any benefit. Gender düferences are con-
spicuous in this regard since this last group of people consists mainly of old wo-
men who have been housewives during most of their adult lives and whose farnily 
unit has an income level higher than that established in the means test, probably 
because such family unit is composed by one or more wage earners or recipients of 
welfare benefits (Durán, 1995, pp.467-468). In 1994, 97% of men and 66% 
of women (both older than 6S years and who did not perform paid work) received 
a state pensiono Less than half of these women received a pension based on their 
own contributions while the rest received widow's pensions. 1.2 million of women 
aged 6S or over did not receive any state pension (CES, 1995, ppAI4). 
Although theoretically the elderly might live in centres, where they receive 
the care needed, in practice most of the elderly live in their homes or in the homes 
of their relatives but not in centres. In 1994, approximately 2.8% of the elderly 
were cared for in public or prívate old people's homes (CES, 1995, pp.445-446). 
The most common type of family in Spain is the nuclear family. It is formed 
by a couple who live with one or more children. The extended family, where other 
relatives live with one or two parents and dependent children, is clearly less com-
mon.22 In fact, the elderly living with their adult children is not the option prefer-
red by either party. The former prefer to live in their own homes as long as possib-
le (CES, 1995, pp.447-448); De Miguel, 1994, pp.802-803). This option is facili-
tated by the fact that a large number of elderly people own their homes in Spain. In 
1993, 69% of the elderly lived in dwellings which they owned (INSERSO, 1995a, 
p.39), although many of the places where old people live are not adequately equip-
Assistential pensions for people aged 66 or over existed from the 1960s but were 
abolished in 1992, except for those already receiving the benefit. The amount is fIXed 
yearly and is the same for all people who receive it. Afterwards, many of these 
people have applied for non-connibutory old age pensions, because the amount of the 
latter is higher. 
22 The state rewards relatives who live with the elderly by granting these relatives 
personal income tax relief. IRPF tax payers can benefit from tax relief if they live 
with one or more parents, grandparents, and so on, whose income is lower than the 
mínimum wage. In 1997 the amount of the exemption was: 16,500 pesetas (868 
Swedish crowns) if the relative is 65-75 years old; 32,900 (1,731 Swedish crowns) if 
the relative is aged 75 or overo In the fiscal year 1993, 446,817 IRPF tax payers were 
the beneficiaries of the first tax exemption (for living with a relarive aged 65-75 
years) and 441,991 of the second tax exemption (for living with a relarive aged 75 or 
over (MER, 1995: 108). 
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ped to meet their needs.23 Nevertheless, it is important to understand that, in gene-
ral, members of Spanish families do not need to live together in order to feel that 
they belong to a moral community whose rnembers should share economic resour-
ces and provide care when required (CES, 1995, p.286; Pérez-Díaz and Rodríguez, 
1994, p.35). 
When the elderly are in need of care or of any other type of help, they are 
helped by relatives in the majority of cases. For instance, when an old person is ill, 
she or he is taken care for by relatives in 90% ofthe cases (Rodríguez, 1994, p.56). 
These relatives are usually (although no exclusively) women, mainly spouses or 
daughters and, to a lesser extent, daughters-in-Iaw and other female relatives 
(INSERSO, 1995b). The majority of the elderly who declare that they need help 
are helped by others. In 1993, the opposite was the case to less than 4% of old 
people who declared that they needed help but did not receive it (INSERSO, 
1995a, p.63). 
The preceding paragraphs should not lead the reader to the conclusion that 
the elderly in Spain are simply dependent people. Help and care are provided reci-
procally by the elderly and their relatives. For instance, in 1993, 35% of the elderly 
with children confmned that they helped them with domestic work or in caring for 
their grand-children (INSERSO, 1995a, p.79). 
When the elderly need the help of others, they (and their relatives) get very 
little help from the state. Social services provided by the authorities for the elderly 
are very scarce in Spain in comparison with other countries. Personal social 
services appeared aboye all in the late 1980s, in contrast with other EU member 
states where they have been developed since the 1960s and 1970s. The main social 
services for the elderly are horne helps, day care centres, holiday programmes, 
stays in places with thermal baths and subsidies to non-profit non-governmental 
organisations working with the elderly, and to the elderly associations (CES, 
1994a). To exemplify the lack of social services in Spain, it may be mentioned that 
the number of beneficiarles of the main social service, home helps, was 25,214 old 
people in 1993 (CES, 1994a. p.242).24 
To summarise, public provision of social services is very scarce in the 
Spanish welfare state. This circumstance hinders the participation of sorne women 
in the labour market in equal terms with men, since women perform most (unpaid) 
care work. There is still another dimension in which continental welfare states 
have not enhanced women's capacity to gain economic independence via labour 
market participation. The importance of the state as an employer of women has 
already been stressed (Meyer, 1994). Because the continental welfare state 
provides very few social services, it employs less women than if the welfare state 
were less transfer-oriented and provided more services. The reason is that care is in 
23 In 1993, 66% of the dwellings where the elderly lived had no heating, 18% had no 
telephone, and 7% had no hot water (INSERSQ, 1995a, p.41). 
24 This number refers to beneficiarles in the territories administered at that time by the 
central state in this policy area, that is, all regions except Andalusia, the Basque 
country, the Canary IsIand!, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and Valencia (Spain is com-
posed of 17 regions). 
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a11 countties mainly provided by women, whether on an unpaid basis or in 
exchange for wages (if the wages are paid by the state, this provision of care is 
called 'social services'). In Spain, 29% of female wage-eamers and 21 % of male 
wage-earners were employed by the state (calculated by the author from data 
contained in lNE, 1996, p.223, p.225; second quarter of 1996 data). It has been 
argued that the comparatively better situation of women in Scandinavia has been 
achieved in part through an 'alliance' between women and the welfare state (if I 
am allowed to use this personalising metaphor). Social policy has not only dirni-
nished women's responsibility for providing unpaid care work in the farnily 
sphere, but has also employed women in the sector of public provision of services 
(Langan and Ostner, 1991, p.135). 
ID. Equal employment policies 
As has been observed, Spanish women face obstacles if they attempt to gaín econ-
omic independence by perforrning paid work. The labour market is segmented and 
women are overrepresented in the worst segments, that is, those who are un-
employed, employed in the underground economy or temporarily employed in the 
formal sector of the economy. The welfare state provides few social services which 
help women to combine family and work responsibilities. These obstacles still 
exist in spite of the development of equal employment policies (EEP)25 at the cen-
tral state level during the last twenty years. As we shall see, the main EEP in 
relation to gender have been the revision of discriminatory legislation, the exten-
sion of paid matemity leave and non-paid parentalleaves (see the preceding sec-
tion for a description of these leaves), and the promotion of research on labour 
matters with an analytical focus on gender. In this section largue that the impact 
of EEP has been limited, because EEP have not tackled either the segmented 
structure of the labour market or the continental characteristics of the Spanish wel-
fare state. 
With respect to the revision of discriminatory legislation inherited from for-
mer times, the 1978 Constitution included the prohibition of gender discrirnination 
before the law (art.14), in the labour market (art.35.1) and in the civil service 
(art.35.1). Former legislation has been revised, in order to abolish its discrirni-
natory aspects. In practice, this process of revision meant that women were 
allowed to perform sorne types of work which were prohibited to them in the past, 
such as night work, or to perform varlous jobs also previously closed to them, for 
instance, in the police, in the army, or the mining sector (Valiente, 1994, pp.301-
311). 
25 According to Mazur (1992, p.54), 'equal employment policy means any policy 
(legislation, decree, program, etc.) which targets direct or indirect discrimination 
based on gender, race, religion or age in hiring, fmng, professional training and pro-
motion'. In this paper I concentrate on the study of EEP in relation to gender at the 
central state level (and not at the regional or locallevel), because the right to legislate 
in labour maners belongs to the central state (MTSS, 1995, p.32). 
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Nowadays the principIe of equality of all citizens before the law informs 
generallegislation. The discriminatory clauses that exist are contained in collective 
agreements negotiated between representatives of employers and workers. Wage 
discrlmination is one of the most common forms of gender discrimination. It oc-
curs with the creation of labour categorles that include only or mainly women. 
These female workers are paid less than workers ineluded in mixed, or male categ-
orles. Many job offers are also discrlminatory, because they are directed to only 
one sexo This is common, as can be seen from the job offer pages of newspapers 
(De la Fuente and Crespán, 1995; Sáez, 1994, p.139). 
The revision of discriminatory legislation and the subsequent approval of 
gender-neutral new legislation has been an important reformo Legislators have sent 
a clear message to society that overt gender discrimination is no longer tolerated 
(at least in generallegislation). Women may now use the law to fight for or defend 
a better position in the labour market. Nevertheless, the importance of the reform 
CanDot be overstated, since very few women have initiated a legal process in mat-
ters of gender discrimination (De la Fuente and Crespán, 1995, p.l; Sáez, 1994, 
p.29). 
Another significant EEP has been the promotion of research on issues related 
to women and the labour market by the main state feminist institution at the central 
state level, the Institute of the Woman (Instituto de la Mujer, 1M).26 One objective 
put forward in the founding documents of the Institute was to study all aspects of 
women's situation in Spain. This is an important task, because when the 1M was 
founded in 1983, little research of this type existed, particularly compared with the 
level of research on the status of women in other advanced industrialised 
democracies. The 1M has published books, given grants to researchers, established 
awards and prizes for the best books and artieles, commissioned pieces of research, 
and established a documentation centre in Madrid. 
The aforementioned EEP have led a very small number women to fight in 
court for equal treatment in the work place, have provided an important number of 
working women with a paid-matemity leave (but have not helped them to combine 
professional and caring responsibilities after the end of this leave), and have con-
tributed to increase the knowledge about gender issues in the labour market. 
Nevertheless, EEP have not tackled the segmentation of the labour market in the 
four spaces differently populated by women and men, nor have they modified 
(even slightly) the continental characteristics of the welfare state. As a result, EEP 
have been of limited help in demolishing the obstacles that women face for the 
achievement of equal status in the labour market. 
26 Since the 196Os, institutions with the concrete purpose of promoting gender equality 
have been set up, developed (and sometimes even dismantled) in most industrial 
countries. In social science literature such institutions have been called 'state femi-
nist' institutions. bureaucrncies or machineries. The people who work in them are 
described as 'femocrats' or 'state feminists' (Stetson and Mazur, 1995). 
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IV. Stratification among women 
The labour market and the welfare state foster stratification along class lines 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1995) but also along gender lines (Langan and Ostner, 
1991; Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1994). In this section largue that the 
labour market and the welfare state might also produce stratification within sexes, 
as is the case of different age groups of women in Spain. As 1 shall explain, a very 
different set of professional opportunities and constraints has been given to women 
under or over approximately 45. Although very different situations within both age 
groups can be found, it is possible to generalise about the differences between the 
two. Generally speaking, women over 45 carne of age empowered with less educa-
tion than men of their cohorts and social class. Women over 45 carne of age at a 
time when housewifery was the prevalent option for women. As a resulto most of 
them abandoned the labour market (if ever present there) and never retorned. Wo-
men under 45 are empowered with the same education as men of their cohorts and 
social class, and many attempt to participate in the labour market at a time when 
housewifery is a socially discredited option. 
With regards to women over 45, the majorlty of them do not participate in the 
labour market, as can be seen in Table 10.1. It was often the case that these women 
had not attained the same educational level as men of their generation and social 
class (as is shown in Table 10.3), since they grew up in a period when more impor-
tance was attached by families and the state to the education of men than to that of 
women. Women over 45 carne of age during the authoritarian regime, when house-
wifery was the option for married women encouraged by public policies and by the 
official discourse and propaganda. Moreover, housewifery was broadly seen as the 
most socially accepted choice. Therefore, while it was not that uncornmon for 
single young women to work for wages, most women left the labour market after 
marriage (if they were ever present there). Since then, they have been almost 
entirely in charge of domestic taslcs, arid have also cared for any relative in need of 
care.27 
What makes these women over 45 different from other women of that age in 
other countries is that most of them left the labour market forever and not only for 
a limited perlod of time. Housewifery was seen in the past as a long-term status, 
and not as a temporary situation mandated by the requirements of rearing children. 
After having been out of the labour force for so long (two or more decades), it is 
not feasible for most of them to retum to the formallabour market (spaces 1 and 2) 
although their chances in space 3 are slightly higher. 
27 Class differences are, of course, imponant among these women who are older than 
45. Upper-class women could hire domestic workers to peñorm household tasks and 
care, while low-class women not only peñorm most household and caring tasks in 
their households, but, in some cases, also in the household of others as domes tic 
workers in order to supplement the family income. In any case, women of all social 
classes have had in common the responsibility for organising (andlor providing them-
selves) the peñormance of household duties and of caring. In the past, they have also 
had to face a social stigma, if they wished to engage in paid work outside the home 
after being manied or having children. 
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Table 10.3 
Educational attainment (university level) by 
age group and gender, Spain, 1991 
Yearsold 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Men 8.0 15.6 14.2 12.5 8.5 5.7 
Women 13.9 19.8 15.7 10.0 4.6 2.8 
Source: OECD (1994, p.67). 
A common situation for women aged 45 or over is to live in a household where a 
relative (usually the husband) is employed as a 'core' worker. Given the high rate 
of unemployment and temporary employment, and the low activity rates in 
Spain,28 many 'core' workers provide for other relatives. In families with one 
'core' worker and dependent relatives it is beneficial for the family as a whole that 
the 'core' worker maintains the status of a fixed-termed employee. This usually 
implies the maintenance of a gendered division of labour within the households (he 
provides and she performs domestic and caring work). The problem is that 
situations which can be beneficial from the family point of view might be detri-
mental for individual members oí. the family, if they try to achieve independence 
from each other but end up choosing options that erode their potential to be econo-
mically independent. 
As for women under 45 (named 'younger' women in what follows), they 
have come (or are coming of age) after a hidden revolution has taken place in 
Spanish families, as many parents have decided that they should give their daugh-
ters and son s the same education. A number of studies have demonstrated the 
existence of this attitude (Aguinaga and Comas, 1991, pp.181-183; Escario, 
Alberdi and Berlín, 1987, p.49), which contrasts with the traditional idea that boys 
needed an education to prepare them for work outside the home, whilst girls 
should be trained to be home-makers. Tbis traditional idea has also been revealed 
by research (De Pablo, 1976, p.378). Moreover, and more importantIy, parents 
have been acting in accordance with these egalitarian ideas regarding their 
offspring's education. In addition, educational policies have increasingly promoted 
the enrolment of girls and women in education. As a result, many young women 
are now as qualified as the men of their generation and social class (or even more 
qualified) to participate in the labour market). This can be seen in Table 10.3, 
which shows that educational attainment at university level in 1991 was higher for 
women than for men under 35. Thus, in comparison with older women, younger 
women have the advantage of being more educated. 
28 The activity rate is the proportion oC active people (the employed and the registered 
unemployed) in the population oCworking age. The Spanish activity rate (48%) is the 
second lowest in the EU aCter Italy (47%), and it is seven points below the EU 
average (55%) (Eurostat, 1996b; 1995 data). 
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Younger women are encouraged to perform paid work outside the home, 
siftce performing a paid job after marriage or the first delivery is no longer a 
socially and politically stigmatised option. Quite the contrary, housewifery is now 
a socially discredited status, to the amazement of sorne women over 45 who con-
sider that either they had been cheated when they were encouraged or forced to be 
housewives or that younger women are nevertheless choosing the wrong option of 
being workers and mothers at the same time. 
In Spain, a large proportion of young adults live in their parents home UDtil 
their mid-or late-twenties. In Spring 1995,77% ofpeople aged 15-29lived in their 
parents' home. Moreover, this was the case for 52% of people aged 25-29 (Martín 
Serrano, 1996a, p.5; 1996b, p.2). Most young women and men leave their parents' 
home to marry and form a new household. From this moment, younger and older 
women have in common the fact that they are both in charge of the organisation 
(and in many cases also the actual performance) of household and caring duties. 
Both women live in a country where the welfare state is transfer-oriented and 
offers very limited social services. Most younger women are not 'core' workers 
andare married to men who are not 'core' workers either. This circumstance 
pushes younger women to participate in the labour market (Adam, 1996). It is in 
this context that we have to understand why Spain (together with ltaly) has the 
lowest fertility rates in the world (synthetic index of fertility: 1,22 in 1994 -
Eurostat, 1996a, p.l16) (Esping-Andersen, 1995). Women are 'choosing' to have 
fewer children and to delay their pregnancies, after having postponed marriage (the 
number of children boro out of wedlock is in Spain very low in comparative terms) 
while attempting to participate in a segmented labour market, and finding little or 
no help from the state to combine professional and family responsibilities. 
It is again important to remember that most women who perform paid jobs do 
so on a full-time basis, in contrast to other countries where part-time work is very 
prevalent. Nevertheless, the regulation of part-time work has changed in recent 
years, and it is now an attractive option for employers. As a result, the number of 
part-time jobs is increasing. As in other countries, these jobs are mainly performed 
by women. Most new part-time jobs performed by women are for very low skilled 
workers. In contrast, an important number of part-time jobs performed by men are 
for very skilled workers (CES, 1996, pp.l58-162). 
V. Conclusion 
In Spain in the last three or four decades the number of women participating in the 
labour market has increased significantly. Nevertheless, women are entering a seg-
mented labour market, in which, in comparison to men, they are underrepresented 
in the core (composed of those with indefinite-duration contracts), and overrepre-
sented among those temporarily employed or employed in the informal economy, 
and especially among the registered unemployed. In fact, in Spain a significant 
number of women begin to participate in the labour market by registering as un-
employed instead of starting to work for wages. Given the very high rate of female 
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unemployrnent and the still high number of women who do not perform paid work 
and are not registered as unemployed, a crucial division in the Spanish female 
population of working age is still between those who perform paid work and those 
who do noto This is different from other countries where the majority or a signi-
ficant number of women are wage-earners, and where there ís a fundamental divi-
sion of the laOOur force into 'goodjobs' and 'bad jobs' (O'Connor, 1993). In addi-
tion, given the high rate of temporary contracts in Spain, a central division within 
the group of women (and men) who work for wages is between those who have an 
indefinite contract and those who do noto 
In their attempts to be among those who perform paid work, women in Spain 
(and in other continental welfare states) find Hule support from a welfare state 
which is h~avily transfer-oriented and provides very few personal social services. 
Although it cannot be argued that women have a subordinate position in the 
Spanish laOOur rilarket mainIy because the welfare state is of a continental type, it 
is true that care is provided in most cases by women and that in some cases care-
giving is conflictual or incompatible with the performance of paid work. 
In Spain, a segmented laOOur market and a continental welfare state are the 
main (or two of the main) barriers against the equal status of women in the eco-
nomic sphere. These obstacles have not been tackled by the introduction and de-
velopment of equal employment policies over the last twenty years. These policies 
have consisted of the revision of discrirninatory legislation inherited from former 
times and the subsequent approval of gender-neutral new legislation; the extension 
of paid maternity leave and non-paid parentalleave from paid employrnent to care 
for small children (and the inclusion of fathers among their potential bene-
ficiarles); and the promotion of research on issues related 10 women and the labour 
market. These policies are important because they have allowed women to fight in 
court for equal treatment in the work place, although very few have initiated a 
legal process with regard to gender discrimination. Equal employment policies 
have allowed women and men to stop working in connection with child birth while 
stilI receiving their salaries, although the overwhelming majority of men have 
decided not to 'benefit' from matemity leave. Finally, in part as a resolt of equal 
employment policies, information and knowledge aOOut gender issues in the laOOur 
market is broader than it was two decades ago. Nevertheless, equal employrnent 
policies have been of very Hule help in demolishing the main obstacles that 
women face to achieving equal status in the economic sphere: segmentation in 
labour market and the continental characteristics of the welfare state. 
Finally, the laOOur market and the welfare state (among others) have provided 
a very different set of opportunities and constraints for women who are either over 
or under 45. The former have been given many incentives to leave the labour 
market (if they were even present there) after marriage or the first delivery, while 
the lauer have been given some incentives to try to participate in the labour 
market. 
A future paper could explore three related questions. First, it woold be inte-
resting to research further what incentives women younger than 45 years old have 
been given in their attempts to be wage-eamers. Given the lack of personal social 
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services provided by the state, it might be the case that the majority of these 
younger women are given incentives to participate in the labour market not on 
equal terms with men, but rather as another category of workers: less committed to 
their jobs, because these have to be compatible with the performance of household 
and caring duties. 
Second, it would be important to study intra-family solidarity. Many younger 
women are now as educated as the men of their cohort and social class. This might 
be the outcome of gender equality policies in the area of education, but it is more 
the result of family strategies of empowering not only sons but also daughters. It is 
not clear if families later support or not (and how) adult women once they are 
participating in the labour market. 
Third, the development of part-time work will have to be followed carefully. 
A peculiarity of the Spanish labour market is that many women remain in em-
ployment after marriage and child rearing, performing full-time jobs although 
there is a lack social services (child care, for instance). As we said, in recent years, 
part-time work has been increasing. Two future scenarios seem now possible: the 
maintenance of the status quo; or the further increase in part-time jobs to reach the 
same level as in other countries. This would mean the appearance of another 
gender division in the Spanish labour market, between full-time workers (mainly 
men), and part-time workers (mainly women, and possibly the young too). 
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